Yes indeed, “for the sake of humankind.” The benefits are obvious, but I worry about two things. First, the bonds of trust have been eroded by all involved and particularly by the Trump administration, which seems to approach everything from the perspectives of arrogance and contempt for adversaries, however defined. The pointless hostilities between the U.S. and Iran is the most recent demonstration of the failure of this approach. Have we learned anything? Most likely not. Second, China may, quite correctly, view itself as pulling ahead of the U.S. and believe we could not pull our weight in a joint effort. Why throw a rope to a competitor who seeks to contain you? Difficult times.
Two technological blocs may be more likely to emerge than the shared “space station model” that Stephen hopes for.
I very much agree with Stephen’s broader instinct: scientific cooperation between the United States and China remains deeply valuable, not only for both countries, but for the world. His International Space Station analogy is also useful because it reminds us that even rival powers can sometimes preserve cooperation when the institutional design creates enough mutual dependence.
My concern is that today’s U.S.-China technology relationship may have already moved beyond the conditions that made that kind of model possible.
The old structure of U.S.-China science and technology cooperation was built in an era when China was still largely a technology recipient, a source of talent, and a destination for industrial offshoring. That world has changed. China is now one of the central nodes of global scientific production, engineering diffusion, and industrial-scale deployment. The ASPI report showing China leading in 66 of 74 critical technologies is not a complete measure of technological power, but it does capture a major shift: the United States can no longer understand China merely as a follower in the global technology system.
In many fields, the United States increasingly needs access to Chinese scientists, Chinese data, Chinese engineering sites, Chinese supply chains, and China’s speed of industrial iteration. But the American political system seems increasingly unable to accept that dependence. Instead, it often redefines that dependence as a security risk.
This is where the International Space Station analogy may become harder to apply. The ISS was a bounded scientific and engineering project with high sunk costs and clear operational interdependence. But AI, semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, and digital infrastructure are not isolated scientific projects. They are also industrial platforms, military-relevant capabilities, supply-chain systems, and sources of economic power.
As the boundary of national security keeps expanding, scientific cooperation is no longer treated as an exception. It becomes one of the first things to be scrutinized. Semiconductors are national security. AI is national security. EV software is national security. Battery supply chains are national security. Data flows are national security. Even university cooperation can be reframed as a technology-transfer risk.
So the issue is not that U.S.-China cooperation is impossible. There is still enormous room for cooperation in basic science, climate, public health, agriculture, energy, and global governance. The deeper problem is that Washington’s political direction is moving toward tighter controls, narrower cooperation channels, and broader securitization of technology relations.
China may still prefer cooperation in many areas, but when key technology channels are continuously restricted, Beijing will also feel compelled to build countermeasures and reciprocal deterrence. In that sense, China’s export controls and other responses are less about rejecting cooperation than about avoiding unilateral vulnerability.
The more likely future, in my view, is not total separation. It is the emergence of two technology ecosystems that are increasingly independent, yet still partially overlapping.
This structure may develop in four layers.
The first layer is hard decoupling: advanced semiconductors, frontier AI computing, military-related quantum technologies, parts of satellite and space technology, critical industrial software, and high-end equipment.
The second layer is limited overlap: basic science, public health, climate research, agriculture, parts of energy technology, and non-sensitive research data.
The third layer is competitive coexistence: EVs, batteries, solar, wind, robotics, industrial internet, AI applications, and digital infrastructure, where both sides build their own standards, supply chains, and platforms while competing globally.
The fourth layer is gray-zone interdependence: open-source models, scientific papers, third-country supply chains, multinational R&D networks, Chinese scientists abroad, and multilateral institutions.
Stephen’s cooperation model is morally and intellectually appealing. But the political economy of technology competition now seems to be pushing the United States and China toward partial technological bifurcation rather than a shared scientific infrastructure.
Thank you for such a thoughtful response. Your four layer approach is important — tech is certainly not homogeneous. Not sure I agree with who goes in which bucket but the point on a hierarchy of collaborative opportunities makes great sense.
Who are you kidding? This is the country that felt threatened by Huawei and responded by having the founder's daughter kidnapped by Canadian goons. This contest is already over.
Yes indeed, “for the sake of humankind.” The benefits are obvious, but I worry about two things. First, the bonds of trust have been eroded by all involved and particularly by the Trump administration, which seems to approach everything from the perspectives of arrogance and contempt for adversaries, however defined. The pointless hostilities between the U.S. and Iran is the most recent demonstration of the failure of this approach. Have we learned anything? Most likely not. Second, China may, quite correctly, view itself as pulling ahead of the U.S. and believe we could not pull our weight in a joint effort. Why throw a rope to a competitor who seeks to contain you? Difficult times.
Two technological blocs may be more likely to emerge than the shared “space station model” that Stephen hopes for.
I very much agree with Stephen’s broader instinct: scientific cooperation between the United States and China remains deeply valuable, not only for both countries, but for the world. His International Space Station analogy is also useful because it reminds us that even rival powers can sometimes preserve cooperation when the institutional design creates enough mutual dependence.
My concern is that today’s U.S.-China technology relationship may have already moved beyond the conditions that made that kind of model possible.
The old structure of U.S.-China science and technology cooperation was built in an era when China was still largely a technology recipient, a source of talent, and a destination for industrial offshoring. That world has changed. China is now one of the central nodes of global scientific production, engineering diffusion, and industrial-scale deployment. The ASPI report showing China leading in 66 of 74 critical technologies is not a complete measure of technological power, but it does capture a major shift: the United States can no longer understand China merely as a follower in the global technology system.
In many fields, the United States increasingly needs access to Chinese scientists, Chinese data, Chinese engineering sites, Chinese supply chains, and China’s speed of industrial iteration. But the American political system seems increasingly unable to accept that dependence. Instead, it often redefines that dependence as a security risk.
This is where the International Space Station analogy may become harder to apply. The ISS was a bounded scientific and engineering project with high sunk costs and clear operational interdependence. But AI, semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, and digital infrastructure are not isolated scientific projects. They are also industrial platforms, military-relevant capabilities, supply-chain systems, and sources of economic power.
As the boundary of national security keeps expanding, scientific cooperation is no longer treated as an exception. It becomes one of the first things to be scrutinized. Semiconductors are national security. AI is national security. EV software is national security. Battery supply chains are national security. Data flows are national security. Even university cooperation can be reframed as a technology-transfer risk.
So the issue is not that U.S.-China cooperation is impossible. There is still enormous room for cooperation in basic science, climate, public health, agriculture, energy, and global governance. The deeper problem is that Washington’s political direction is moving toward tighter controls, narrower cooperation channels, and broader securitization of technology relations.
China may still prefer cooperation in many areas, but when key technology channels are continuously restricted, Beijing will also feel compelled to build countermeasures and reciprocal deterrence. In that sense, China’s export controls and other responses are less about rejecting cooperation than about avoiding unilateral vulnerability.
The more likely future, in my view, is not total separation. It is the emergence of two technology ecosystems that are increasingly independent, yet still partially overlapping.
This structure may develop in four layers.
The first layer is hard decoupling: advanced semiconductors, frontier AI computing, military-related quantum technologies, parts of satellite and space technology, critical industrial software, and high-end equipment.
The second layer is limited overlap: basic science, public health, climate research, agriculture, parts of energy technology, and non-sensitive research data.
The third layer is competitive coexistence: EVs, batteries, solar, wind, robotics, industrial internet, AI applications, and digital infrastructure, where both sides build their own standards, supply chains, and platforms while competing globally.
The fourth layer is gray-zone interdependence: open-source models, scientific papers, third-country supply chains, multinational R&D networks, Chinese scientists abroad, and multilateral institutions.
Stephen’s cooperation model is morally and intellectually appealing. But the political economy of technology competition now seems to be pushing the United States and China toward partial technological bifurcation rather than a shared scientific infrastructure.
Thank you for such a thoughtful response. Your four layer approach is important — tech is certainly not homogeneous. Not sure I agree with who goes in which bucket but the point on a hierarchy of collaborative opportunities makes great sense.
The United States is at risk of falling behind China in scientific leadership. It hasn’t happened yet?? It happened 5 years ago.
Today, China leads in published papers, including the top 1% most cited, and in all 74 twenty-first century sciences and technologies.
Who are you kidding? This is the country that felt threatened by Huawei and responded by having the founder's daughter kidnapped by Canadian goons. This contest is already over.